Mazhar Waseem (University of Manchester)： Information, Asymmetric Incentives, Or Withholding? Understanding the Self-Enforcement of Value-Added Tax
主题：Information, Asymmetric Incentives, Or Withholding? Understanding the Self-Enforcement of Value-Added Tax
主讲人：英国曼彻斯特大学 Mazhar Waseem助理教授
Mazhar Waseem博士，英国曼彻斯特大学助理教授，主要研究税收政策。在Quarterly Journal of Economics，Journal of Political Economy，Journal of Public Economics，Review of Economics and Statistics等重要学术刊物发表多篇。担任Econometrica, American Economic Review, Quarterly Journal of Economics, Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economics and Statistics, American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, Journal of Public Economics, Economic Journal, Scandinavian Journal of Economics, National Tax Journal等刊物评审专家。
During the period 1996-2000, the coverage of VAT in Pakistan rose by twenty times in terms of the number of firms in the tax net and by ten times in terms of the volume of transactions subject to it. This paper leverages this staggered introduction of VAT in the country to estimate its enforcement spillovers. Focusing on firms already in the tax net, I explore if their tax compliance improves as VAT gets extended to their trading partners. Using differential responses to upward and downward extension of the tax, I characterize the mechanisms underlying the self-enforcement response.