主题：Understanding Rule Precision 理解规则精度

主讲人：北京大学经济学院 年永威助理教授

主持人：财政税务学院 罗宇讲师

时间：11月3日 上午10:00-11:30

地点：柳林校区格致楼918会议室

主办单位：财政税务学院 科研处

主讲人简介：

年永威，北京大学经济学院助理教授。他于2024年获得博科尼大学的经济学博士学位。他的研究领域是发展经济学和环境经济学，尤其关注地方政府行为和地方环境政策。研究成果发表于American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, Journal of Development Economics, 《经济学(季刊)》《经济学报》等期刊，并主持国家自然科学基金青年项目(C类)。

内容提要：

Modern states frequently refine existing rules to more precisely translate case facts into enforcement actions. We develop a novel empirical framework to quantify the implied precision of rules for enforcement. The framework represents a rule as two stochastic mappings: one from case facts to discretionary tiers and another from such tiers to enforcement actions. Combining administrative case records, large language models, and expert validation, we estimate these mappings and the implied precision of a rule. Applying the framework to a staggered Chinese reform that refined tax administrative penalty rules, we show that the reform increased rule precision without affecting other margins such as rule harshness. Combining difference-in-differences, high-frequency event studies, and shift-share designs, we find that greater precision (a) improved enforcement quality; (b) expanded firm investment, employment, and output; and (c) increased firm entry and government revenue. The evidence points to reduced discretionary distortions rather than changes in case composition, enforcer composition, or strategic firm responses. Our findings thus provide a microfoundation for understanding how more precise rules can improve regulatory quality and generate substantial economic gains.

现代国家经常通过细化既有规则来更精确地根据案件事实确定执法行为。本讲座主要研究以新的实证框架，来量化规则所隐含的执法精度。该框架将规则表示为两个随机映射：一是从案件事实到自由裁量档次的映射，二是从裁量档次到执法行为的映射。结合行政案件记录、大语言模型和专家验证，我们估计了这两重映射，并据此测度规则所隐含的执法精度。我们将该框架应用于中国一项分批实施的税务行政处罚规则细化改革，发现改革提高了规则精度，却未改变规则所暗含的处罚力度等其他维度。综合运用双重差分法、高频事件研究法和份额转移式研究设计，我们发现，规则精度的提升改善了执法质量，促进了企业投资、雇佣和产出的增长，并增加了企业进入和政府财政收入。这些效应主要源于自由裁量扭曲的减少，而非案件结构、执法人员构成或企业策略性应对行为的变化。因此，本研究的发现为理解更精确的规则如何改善监管质量并带来可观的经济收益提供了微观基础。